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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, in the : 
interest of, Case No. 870578-CA 
W.D., : Priority No. 13 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a), (5) (Supp. 1988) and R. Utah S. Ct. 42 
(1989) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the 
Juvenile Court's yield of jurisdiction to California where the 
parties had substantial connections to California? 
2. Whether petitioners where denied due process when 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Juvenile Court finding, at a 
hearing subsequent to W.D.'s transfer, that it would have yielded 
jurisdiction to California even if the hearing had occurred 
prior to W.D.'s transfer? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State concurs with the facts set forth by the Court 
of Appeals in its opinion in In Re W.D. v. Drakef 103 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1989). Any facts pertinent to the 
determination of this petition and not referenced by the Court of 
Appeals are detailed in the relevant portions of the argument 
below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioners were not a Utah family at the time the 
Juvenile Court yielded jurisdiction to California. Petitioners 
and W.D. had substantial connections with California and 
declination of jurisdiction by Utah was proper at the time. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals opinion, based upon the record 
evidence before it, properly affirmed the lower court's order. 
Even though W.D.'s transfer to California without a prior Utah 
hearing initially infringed petitioners' due process rights, 
subsequent hearings established that the Juvenile Court would 
have yielded jurisdiction to California if a hearing had been 
held at the time of the transfer and it was not an abuse of 
discretion to decline jurisdiction after W.D.'s transfer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECLINED JURISDICTION AFTER 
FINDING THAT UNDER THE SIGNIFICANT 
CONNECTIONS PROVISION OF THE UCCJA THE STATE 
OF CALIFORNIA WAS THE MOST APPROPRIATE AND 
CONVENIENT FORUM IN WHICH TO LITIGATE THE 
CUSTODY OF W.D. 
Initially, the State agrees with petitioners' assertion 
that the Court of Appeals was correct in determining that the 
most appropriate forum in which to litigate the custody of W.D. 
depended upon the best interests of the child, in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-45c-7(3) (1987). However, petitioners' 
further interpretation of this section is incorrect. Petitioners 
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suggest that all five factors listed under this section must be 
reviewed before a determination of the best interests of the 
child is made; but a closer reading of the statute reveals that 
the extent of the review of each of the listed factors is left to 
the discretion of the court. The language of this section 
(3) In determining if it is an 
inconvenient forum, the court shall consider 
if it is in the interest of the child that 
another state assume jurisdiction. For this 
purpose it may take into account the 
following factors, among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was 
the child's home state; 
(b) if another state has a closer 
connection with the child and his family or 
with one or more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal 
relationships is more readily available in 
another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on 
another forum which is no less appropriate; 
and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
court of this state would contravene any of 
the purposes stated in § 78-45c-l. 
(Emphasis added.) Although petitioners characterize the Court of 
Appeals' analysis as Mcursory and sloppy" (see petitioner's brief 
at 5), the opinion demonstrates careful consideration of the 
lower court's exercise of discretion in determining that the best 
interests of the child would be served by yielding jurisdiction 
to California based upon the significant connections that the 
state of California had with the baby and his family. Subsection 
(c) of Utah Code Ann. S78-45c-l (1987) explains that one purpose 
of the UCCJA is to: 
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(c) assure that litigation concerning 
the custody of a child take place ordinarily 
in the state in which the child and his 
family have the closest connection and where 
significant evidence concerning his care, 
protection, training, and personal 
relationships is most readily available, and 
that courts of this state decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction when the child and 
his family have a closer connection with 
another state. 
This need for significant evidence and close connection with the 
state that will ultimately exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 
has been addressed by a variety of jurisdictions and cases. In 
the Matter of Custody of Ross, 630 P.2d 353, 357 (Oregon 1981), 
the Court refers to the UCCJA when it states that "the purpose 
which pervades the Act is to provide that the child custody 
determination will be made in the state where there is optimum 
access to evidence." This "optimum access to evidence" 
requirement is reflected in Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3 (1987), 
which explains the "home state" test, as well as the "significant 
connections" test. Logically, then, the purpose of the various 
factors is to give some guidance to courts of possible avenues to 
use in determining which state will have "optimum access to 
evidence' and thus be in the best interests of the child; rather 
than simply a list of several prongs which must be met. 
Although the court noted that Utah may qualify as the 
-home state" of W.D. since he was born here, it chose not to 
decide that issue as it determined that the best interests of the 
child would be served if it looked to the significant connections 
between the child, his family, and the state of California. The 
Court of Appeals explained: 
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the Utah UCCJA does not give preference to 
the "home state." The significant connection 
or substantial connection basis "comes into 
play either when the home state test cannot 
be met or as an alternative to that test.M 9 
UCCJA (U.L.A.) S3 comment, 144 (1988) 
(emphasis added). Even though a certain 
state may be the "home state," if "the child 
and his family have equal or stronger ties 
with another state" that other state also has 
jurisdiction. Ijd. ; see also Smith v. Superior 
Court of San Mateo County, 68 Cal.App.3d 457, 
137 Cal.Rptr. 348, 352 (1977). Therefore, 
the fact that Utah may technically have "home 
state" jurisdiction will not prevent 
California from also having jurisdiction 
under the "substantial connection" basis. 
In re W.D. v. Drake, 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (1989). Thus, the 
court turned its attention to the substantial connections between 
the child, his family, and California in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann §78-45c-3(1)(b) (1987) which provides: 
(b) It is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of this state assume 
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his 
parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection 
with this state, and (ii) there is available 
in this state substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
Petitioners' brief suggests that the only "connection" 
California had with the child and his family occurred as a result 
of California's petition and the subsequent transportation of the 
child to that state (see petitioner's brief at 6). However, the 
facts in this case, and the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
reveal that the connections existing at the time of the 
jurisdictional dispute were more substantial. As the Court of 
Appeals noted, "the facts and circumstances considered are those 
in existence when the petition was filed. Rexford v. Rexford, 631 
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P.2d 475, 478 (Alaska 1980)." 103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, n.2. 
When Christine Drake gave birth to W.D. on August 24, 1987, the 
physical presence of the child and his parent were the sole 
connections that these two had to the state of Utah. All of the 
child's personal relations, including father William Mick, the 
baby's maternal grandmother and two maternal aunts, and W.D.'s 
only sibling, Ingrid, lived in California (T. 231-33). Although 
petitioners repeatedly refer to themselves as a "Utah family,' no 
relatives except W.D.'s mother, Christine Drake, lived in Utah at 
the time surrounding this dispute, and Drake did not have any 
sort of permanent or even temporary residence in Utah. Between 
her arrival in Utah on August 1, 1987 and the birth of W.D. on 
August 24, 1987, Drake had lived in two motels and one apartment. 
(T. 211-14). Four days following the birth, she was evicted from 
the apartment for nonpayment and subsequently spent several days 
at a women's shelter. (T. 216-19). In contrast, the court noted 
that: 
Drake and Mick had lived in California 
for several years. W.D. was conceived and 
carried nearly to term there. At the time 
the petition in California was filed, Mick 
was still living in San Francisco and Drake 
had only left to find another state with more 
favorable custody laws. Under these 
circumstances Drake, Mick and W.D. all had 
substantial connections with California, 
thereby meeting the first requirement of the 
substantial connection test. Additionally, 
California authorities had information on the 
parents' mode of living, psychological 
makeup, marital relationship, parenting 
skills, and past interrelationship with 
W.D.'s older sister. This was enough to meet 
the required need of substantial evidence on 
W.D.'s care, protection, training, and 
relationships to satisfy the second 
requirement. 
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103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27 (1989). Petitioners suggest that the 
court's determination was flawed in that the child had never been 
physically present in California until he was transported to the 
state of California after the petition had been filed. However, 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(3) (1987) specifically directs that 
"physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a 
prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody." 
Petitioners' dependence on the physical presence of the child as 
a necessary element for the "significant connections" test 
demonstrates their misunderstanding of the court's distinction 
between the "home state" analysis and the variety of factors 
which combine to establish substantial or significant connections 
necessary for a court to claim appropriate forum jurisdiction, or 
for one state to decline jurisdiction in favor of another forum. 
Petitioners also submit that the evidence possessed by 
the state of California concerning W.D.'s parents and family does 
not pertain to W.D.'s present or future care, as required by the 
statute. (See petitioner's brief at 7,8). However, the evidence 
available in California about the parents and their eldest child 
served as a proper indicator of present and future care of W.D.. 
The information regarding the parents' mode of living, 
psychological states, parenting skills, and relationship with 
W.D.'s sibling in California was the clearest, and perhaps only, 
indicator of "the child's present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships." Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-
While Judge Orme in his dissent notes that the family now 
resides in Utah, that fact was not before the Juvenile Court at 
the time it yielded jurisdiction to California. 
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3(l)(b)(ii) (1987). This is especially true in light of the fact 
that at the time of the petition, such indicators were painfully 
lacking in the state of Utah. In fact, one of the reasons that 
Pat Rothermick, of the State Protective Services, did not feel 
comfortable releasing W.D. to his mother is that besides not 
having a place of her own (she told Rothermick that she was 
staying with friends), she did not have a baby bed, baby clothes, 
baby food, or any evidence that she was prepared to assume the 
responsibilities of caring for a child. (T. 15). She even asked 
Rothermick to lend her $5.00. (T. 18). Petitioners' statement 
that "because the mother and the father intended to continue to 
live in Utah with the child and because they intended to keep the 
child and care for him in Utah, all evidence concerning the 
child's present and future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships was in Utah" (see Petition at 8) and other 
references to this family as a "Utah family" (see petitioner's 
brief at 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14) misrepresent the facts at the 
time of the Juvenile Court hearings in question, and offer no 
insight as to the question of "significant connections." If the 
facts have changed since the initiation of this case, petitioners 
should approach the Juvenile Courts requesting to move 
jurisdiction of this case from California to Utah. Continuing 
this attack of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which must 
be reviewed upon the facts at the time of the petition is not the 
2 
appropriate means to introduce new evidence into the case. 
2 
The second point in the Petition asserts that the Court of 
Appeals' analysis is "haIf-baked" in that it does not recognize 
the rights of W.D.'s parents as Utah citizens with the result 
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Petitioners' final complaint concerning the Court of 
Appeals' opinion and analysis of the UCCJA is that the 
definitional section of the federal Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (PKPA) was misconstrued as not applying to child 
neglect and dependency proceedings. (See Petition at 8). The 
court cites to the case of State ex rel. Dep't. of Human Serv. v. 
Avinger, 104 N.M. 255, 720 P.2d 290, 292 (1986) for the 
proposition that the PKPA does not apply to child dependency and 
neglect proceedings. 103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, n.l (1989). In 
that case, the New Mexico Supreme Court identifies that "the 
legislative history of the PKPA demonstrates that the primary 
purpose of the PKPA is to prevent 'child snatching' by parents 
across state lines." Id. at 292. Further, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court held that "the history of the PKPA stresses the 
importance of preventing 'child snatching' and does not contain 
any reference to child neglect and dependency proceedings. This 
legislative history demonstrates that there was an absence of 
Congressional intent to apply the PKPA to child neglect and 
dependency proceedings." Ld. Based upon this case, the Court of 
Appeals came to the logical conclusion that the PKPA was "not 
important to the resolution of this case." 103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
28, n.l (1989). Petitioners cite an earlier case decided by the 
Cont. that MUtah parents deprived of the custody of their 
child cannot litigate the matter in a Utah court." (See 
petitioner's brief at 9-11). As a result, petitioners argue, the 
fundamental rights to travel and to sustain the relationship 
between parents and child have been violated. This argument 
ignores that the facts which existed at the time of the hearings 
do not permit recognition of W.D. and his parents as a "Utah 
family.-
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Court of Appeals of Arizona, Matter of Pima County Juvenile 
Action, 147 Ariz, 527, 711 P.2d 1200, 1206 (1985), and urge that 
"a more thorough analysis of the PKPA and its language would 
likely lead to the opposite conclusion, as the Arizona Court of 
Appeals held" in that case. (See petitioner's brief at 9). Yet, 
petitioners fail to provide the "more thorough analysis" they 
recommend. The Arizona case held that "in absence of any finding 
that Arkansas no longer had jurisdiction or had declined to 
exercise jurisdiction, juvenile court's order in dependency 
proceedings which awarded legal custody of children to Department 
of Economic Security was a modification of prior Arkansas custody 
decree contrary to provisions of Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act [28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A] and Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act [A.R.S. §§ 8-401 to 8-424]." 711 P.2d at 1201 (1985). The 
fact that Utah, in this case, did decline jurisdiction, 
distinguishes the case at hand and suggests the inapplicability 
of the PKPA to the present facts, as was determined by the court 
in the present matter. In addition to petitioners' lack of 
analysis on this issue, petitioners failed to raise this claim to 
the Court of Appeals and that failure should bar review of the 
matter as part of the petition for certiorari. In State v. 
Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983) the Court held that it will 
not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. This is 
consistent with a policy of allowing the trial court the 
opportunity to remedy errors itself. By analogy, for the same 
policy reasons, the issue of whether the PKPA should control the 
jurisdictional issue in this case should not be reviewed as part 
of a petition for certiorari. 
-10-
POINT II 
PETITIONERS WERE NOT DEPRIVED OF THEIR DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS BY UTAH'S RELEASE OF ITS 
JURISDICTION IN FAVOR OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA AS THE APPROPRIATE AND CONVENIENT 
FORUM FOR THIS DISPUTE. 
Petitioners submit that "the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals in this case essentially states that the Utah courts must 
decline jurisdiction in UCCJA cases regardless of the manner in 
which the other state handles the case and whether or not the 
other state's actions are taken in accordance with the UCCJA, due 
process and principles of fairness." (See petitioner's brief at 
12). This reading of the court's decision is unwarranted. In a 
footnote, the Court of Appeals stated that: 
Although we cannot condone the manner in 
which W.D. was taken to California before 
Judge Matheson declined jurisdiction, nor the 
misstatement of information contained in the 
California petition, we believe the 
subsequent hearings provided the parents 
adequate due process to protect their rights. 
See In re Summers v. Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 
608, 610 (Utah 1980) . 
103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, n.3 (1989). The Court of Appeals at no 
time rules that regardless of the procedures employed, Utah 
courts must decline jurisdiction in favor of competing state 
claims to jurisdiction. In fact, the Court of Appeal's summary 
of the facts provides evidence that petitioners were sufficiently 
represented at both the California hearings and Utah hearings, or 
else were given an opportunity to initiate further action. Ld. 
at 26. For this reason, the court distinguishes the present 
action from situations in which the due process violations have 
not been remedied by subsequent proceedings and prevents such a 
broad application of this case as petitioner suggests. 
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To hold that petitioners rights to due process were 
violated at this juncture of the proceedings does no more than 
punish California for its initial procedural defaults. Although 
the State admits that initially, the inappropriate action of 
transferring the child before Utah declined jurisdiction was a 
violation of due process, the State agrees with the Court of 
Appeals that this violation was successfully remedied by 
subsequent court actions. The record shows that even had W.D. 
remained in Utah until after the Utah hearing, the Juvenile Court 
would still have determined that California had substantial 
connections, and would have declined jurisdiction. Thus, the end 
result would not have varied, even if strict procedural rules had 
been followed. 
Petitioners' final argument is based upon the claim 
that "this is a contest between Utah parents and a California 
social services agency." (See petitioners' brief at 13). 
Because the facts do not support the claim that this family may 
be characterized as a "Utah family" at the time of the hearing, 
petitioners' argument is without support. Even in Judge Orme's 
concurring and dissenting opinion, when he suggests that the 
appropriate action would have been for the Utah Court to simply 
stay the proceeding rather than to dismiss it entirely, he states 
that Hall things considered, California may have initially seemed 
the sensible forum to exercise jurisdiction." Ld. at 28,29. His 
purpose in asserting that the Utah court should have stayed the 
proceeding as authorized by Utah Code Ann. S78-45c-7(5) (1987) is 
that the court then could have reasserted jurisdiction if 
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subsequent actions of the petitioners so warranted. However, in 
the event that petitioners terminate this appeal for review of 
the present decision, they may return to the trial court and move 
for a change of jurisdiction to the state of Utah if the present 
facts prove that such action is appropriate# 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners assert that certiorari should be granted, 
however, they have failed to establish any grounds upon which 
this Court should exercise its discretion to review the decision 
of the Court of Appeals and the State requests that the Petition 
be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /oM day of May, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
x V^SANDRA L. 
y Assistant Attorney General 
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